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Stabroek News

Can Simpson Miller eliminate corruption?
published: Sunday | April 9, 2006

Anthony Woodburn, Contributor


Then Prime Minister P.J.Patterson (second right), leaves the anti-corruption meeting with senior government officials at the Jamaica Conference Centre on May 13, 2005.- RUDOLPH BROWN/CHIEF PHOTOGRAPHER

IN HER inaugural speech, Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller vowed to eliminate corruption. Her ideal was posited exactly 14 years after her predecessor said that not even the smell of corruption would be allowed to destroy the fabric of the Jamaican society.

Any analysis will show that the corruption still flourishes; the notion of eliminating it remains an ideal.

Many scholars have posited various definitions of corruption, but Daniel Kaufmann narrowly defines it as "the abuse of public office for private gain." Some examples of corrupt behaviour include bribery, extortion, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, influence peddling and an appropriation of public assets and properties for private use. Importantly, a corrupt deal does not only involve the giver and the taker in collaboration, it can be undertaken by a single person.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CORRELATIONS

Unfortunately, corruption shares a positive correlation with productivity and a negative correlation with resources. If corruption as the common factor is taken out of the equation, it is then that we ought to seriously consider the co-relation between productivity and resources. Scholars have articulated this view, and with the result of empirical testing, the 'grease the wheel hypothesis' is generally accepted much to the neglect of its counterpart, the 'sand the wheel hypothesis'.

In his article, 'We are all corrupt', Selwyn Ryan argued that corruption is not an African, Asian or Latin American phenomenon, but one that is pervasive in our political system as well. Very little, he argued, has appeared about the subject in the Caribbean for three reasons: firstly, given the absence of documentary evidence, the public relies on the gossip network for information about official malfeasance; secondly, corruption is the tradition of secrecy which prevails in our political system; and thirdly, the behaviour of media in the Caribbean to conceal corruption.

In his book, Development Administration: Jamaican Adaptations, Edwin Jones was more profound in his arguments. He argued that an ideal public administrative sector should act principally as facilitator of private enterprise. As a consequence, the bureaucracy mainly lacks pragmatism and innovation towards solving domestic problems. Recognising that the principle of orthodoxy and tradition is being challenged by new learning, Jones highlighted the potentially corrupt relationship between the state bureaucracy and other élites, having convinced that the state would function on the basis of elitism.

Both Caribbean scholars, Jones and Ryan, have not been alone over the past 30 years in recognising the incestuous relationship between the bureaucracy and the élite. They acknowledged the lead role the bureaucracy played in the level of corruption. With the globalisation of ideas, methods, systems and the intensification of special interests, as a nation, we are held in the crucible of our present difficult circumstances.

These questions are therefore asked: Are Jamaicans experiencing the unintended consequences of globalization, or are we inherently corrupt?

GREASE THE WHEEL HYPOTHESIS

It is argued that excessive taxes and regulation red tape would remain excessive without bribery, but with the possibility of bribery, they may be transformed to less 'real red tape', that is, public officials not enforcing all the rules and regulations in exchange for bribes. This is the exception, and political scientists are not alone in pointing out that, ethical considerations aside, bribery may in fact improve efficiency. The efficient grease hypothesis states that corruption can improve efficiency and that fighting corruption would be counter-productive.

In the book, Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel P. Huntington stated that, "In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralised, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid overcentralised, honest bureaucracy." In a working paper, Meon and Weill argued that the bureaucratic inefficiency that could be compensated by corruption is slowness. In the Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 3, C. Leys argued that bribes could give bureaucrats an incentive to speed up the establishment of new firms, in an otherwise sluggish administration. In his academic paper, 'An equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery', F.T. Lui showed in a formal model that corruption could efficiently lessen the time spent in queues. Ironically, the key component in the various arguments is 'time' and the efficiency of time results in greater productivity. Unfortunately, scholars and practitioners have accepted this 'corrupt' realisation.

Another strong supporting argument for the efficient grease hypothesis, is that corruption may complement the bureaucracy by indirectly improving the quality of its civil servants. Given that wages and salaries in government are low, the potential for 'hustlings and runnings' may constitute additional income or perks, and this may attract highly-skilled civil servants who would otherwise have opted for other jobs. Furthermore, there are civil servants who will extend their competencies and normal working hours, but this gesture is not a matter of being a good civil servant. Instead, it is just for the 'runnings and hustlings'. In the end, the efficiency level of the bureaucracy will increase.

SAND THE WHEEL HYPOTHESIS

The sand the wheel hypothesis makes the assumption that nothing is gained from corruption at the aggregate level, in that, although large sums of money are paid, only individuals and not government revenues will benefit. This is a hypothetical example: If a government agency is awarding offenders tickets for unlawful behaviour, and these tickets must be submitted following long queues to a slow-moving cashier for verification and payment, a briber may want to circumvent this laborious process. This would save him time, effort and money; also, his partner will be richly rewarded. This leakage from government revenues may be identified by the institutional framework which will immediately impose measures to minimise such leakage. In so doing, another layer of the bureaucracy will be piled on, and the corrupt public sector worker will once more design other strategies to protect his or her illegal income. As a consequence, the process will be repeated over and over again. With added layers of bureaucracy, after a while, the once-efficiently greased wheels will turn no more, hence, the 'sand the wheel hypothesis' will reject the 'efficient grease hypothesis'.

Once the wheels of corruption have been clogged in one area of the bureaucracy, influence peddling or actively pursuing special interests may extend corrupt practices to other areas as well. Not surprisingly, other areas may include the judiciary and the legislature. This is the extent to which corruption in one area of the bureaucracy can infect other areas. Jones and Ryan argued that corrupt officials have an incentive to create distortions in other areas of the bureaucracy, in order to preserve their illegal sources of income. In his speech to the Summit of Eight in 1997, Laurence Summers stated that corruption threatens economic growth and stability in many ways by discouraging business, undermining legal notions of property rights and perpetuating vested interests.

Unfortunately, the validity of the efficient grease hypothesis is difficult to reject. Scholars and practitioners have reluctantly accepted this hypothesis. The sand the wheel hypothesis is also difficult to accept as the cracks that were taped over began opening up again. So we are faced with a dilemma: Do we want a bureaucracy that is characterised by corruption and efficiency, or its counterpart, one that is starved of resources and inefficient?

Sadly, the choice is in the hands of our Prime Minister Simpson Miller who we believe has the potential to minimise corruption. Even though a former U.S. President, Ronald Reagan once said: "Government is not about solving problems, government is the problem," we have no empirical evidence to suggest that this statement is consistent with the expectations and rejuvenated spirit of our bureaucracy, and by extension the society.


Prepared by Anthony Woodburn, immediate past president of the Young Economists Association (YEA), University of the West Indies, Mona Campus. Email anthony.woodburn@uwimona.edu.jm

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