Below are excerpts from the Jamaica-Community-Based Police Assessment prepared for the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and USAID, March 2008.

	"The team found that the concept of community-based policing was never fully developed and applied in Grants Pen ... However, considerable preparatory work was done and elements of community-based policing were attemp-ted, which may provide valuable experiences and instruction to the JCF in an effort to roll out community- based policing nationally."
	"According to some officers within the JCF, during the period of the pilot project, Grants Pen had, in their opinion, got out of control. Stakeholders with financial power had improperly influenced policing matters to do with deployments, officer selection and other operational decisions. In the process, the very principle of decentralisation and divi-sional primacy was violated by these stakeholders going directly to the commissioner and disregarding the authority of the divisional commander. The very principle on which community-based policing was to stand - divisional primacy - was subverted by the community police initia-tive pilot project itself."
	"The experiment provided a stronger and permanent police presence in the community and, therefore, a greater capacity to protect the people. However, the deployment was dispro-portionate to Grants Pen's size. For much of the pilot- project period, there were approximately 70 police officers stationed in Grants Pen, a police population of 1:116. The national ratio is 1:300. Given the national strength of the JCF, this deployment was politically and administratively unsus-tainable and has since been reduced to approximately 35, or 1: 233."
	"The data that were genera-ted from this assessment indicate that the level of trust is currently low and that the pilot project did not make any lasting impact on this problem. For example, on a scale of one to 10, the mean rating given by some 300 citizens of their trust of the police in the division was two."
	"During this assessment, a number of respondents complained that police response to violence was deliberately slow and that unresponsiveness was rooted in negative attitudes towards them."
	"A truce did not and could not weaken the power of the gangs. These groups were, therefore, able to negotiate the violence to their advantage."
	"It may be possible to properly maintain this station, but its appeal as a model is much reduced by its high cost, which makes it unlikely to be replicated and sustained elsewhere."
	"The presence of business firms within the building introduces a new element that ensures the interest of these firms in maintaining the building. Moreover, they provide services and opportunities within the community. Unfortunately, these firms are viewed (by some respondents) as serving the neighbouring middle strata rather than the community."
	"The high police density during the pilot project also made it a high-cost operation for the JCF. Such deploy-ments and the attendant high costs made the project unsustainable financially and politically."
	"Based on conversations with JCF officers, some Grants Pen police super-visors were not properly trained or were not qualified for the job. In a classic example of unintended consequences, constables working in the area, perhaps naïvely, perhaps not, came to know the criminals in the neighbourhood. These rela-tionships became the subject of police bribery rumours and allegations."
	"There were no report, seen where benchmarks had been measured for the project."

The report was compiled by Assistant Commissioner of Police John McLean, Professor Anthony Harriott, Dr Elizabeth Ward, John Buchanan and Roopa Karia.