After more than 40 rounds of deadlocked voting, Venezuela and Guatemala last Thursday sensibly agreed to end their contest for a seat on the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and endorse Panama as their compromise replacement.

It was not necessarily the agreed choice, but the pull-back should have happened a long time ago, to allow the U.N. and the Security Council to get on with some serious work, in the absence of what essentially was a conflict between Venezuela and the United States (U.S.).

For, whatever else may have been claimed, Guatemala was America's proxy in the race. Of course, neither Jamaica nor its partners in the Caribbean Community (Caricom) could have supported Guatemala for the Security Council seat, for more than the fact of its past record on human rights and the absence of a full acceptance of those wrongs, particularly during Central America's proxy wars of the 1980s. There are other, fundamental issues, such as Guatemala's claim to all the territory of its English-speaking neighbour and Caricom member, Belize. Guatemala's support of the challenge at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of the European Union's banana regime undermined preferences to the Caribbean.

Venezuela, on the other hand, has been a long and committed partner to the Caricom region and the practical and tangible economic support has been strengthened in recent years by the initiatives of President Hugo Chávez.

Yet, our commitment to Venezuela on this issue notwithstanding, the Caricom region has quietly been urging Caracas on the need to engage Guatemala City in a compromise to end the deadlock. Its candidacy had become untenable.

There is a salutary lesson in this for President Chávez. Many countries would have supported Venezuela's candidacy for the Security Council seat as a sort of counterweight to American dominance and the Anglo-American agenda on the body. But most would expect that execution of foreign policy to be thoughtful and measured, rather than driven by emotion, no matter how big and right the ideal. And even in disagreement, there is usually the need to maintain relationships.

In our case, one such long-standing and, mostly, mutually-beneficially relationship is with the U.S. Even when there is a wide global view that chunks of recent U.S. foreign policy have been fashioned in ideological cordite, our preferred approach would be to coax Washington to new thinking rather than engaging in personal insults in the hope for change. So the characterisation of President Bush as the devil just isn't on.

In the end, from a geo-political perspective, all sides lost in this contest. It is significant that no one, or very few, saw Guatemala as a candidate in its own right. That suggests that there are things to fix in Guatemala's body politic and national psyche, including reclaiming its independence.

But there is a lesson to Washington that even in an environment of doubt about the agenda and tactics of President Chávez, and with all the power and authority at its disposal, it could neither drag, nudge nor coax a sufficient number of countries into support of its designated/preferred candidate.

But President Chávez and his advisers should reflect on how they probably squandered a fine opportunity for a place on the Security Council.