John Rapley
When Hezbollah fighters slipped into Israel and made off with Israeli soldiers in early July, the young Israeli Government decided to take a gamble. With international opinion supportive, it reckoned that it could seize the initiative to launch an all-out assault on its south Lebanese foe. Instead of exchanging Hezbollah prisoners in Israeli jails for its soldiers, the Israeli Government began a bombing campaign designed to take out Hezbollah's military infrastructure, and particularly the arsenal of rocket launchers the force uses to torment northern Israel.
The international community quickly called for peace. Israel judged it would only need a short window of time to take out Hezbollah, during which it demurred. In this it received the solid backing of the American administration. Washington insisted that any ceasefire had to be 'sustainable'. In layman's terms, this meant the ceasefire had to follow the destruction of Hezbollah as a fighting force.
Aerial bombardment
Haunted by memories of its last, painful occupation of southern Lebanon, the Government chose to rely on aerial bombardment. That way, soldiers would not need to be deployed in large numbers. Israeli casualties would be kept to a minimum.
Time went by. The Lebanese civilian death-toll mounted. Hezbollah rockets continued to rain down on Israel, sending up to a million Israelis fleeing to shelters. International sympathy for Israel weakened. In the Arab world, official understanding for Israel's actions turned to condemnation, as governments were forced to respond to the angry cries in their streets.
As the pressure for a ceasefire built, Israel felt its window of time beginning to close. It had no choice but to do what it had wanted to avoid: call up reserves and send in ground troops. After initial advances, it turned out that Hezbollah still wasn't budging. Fierce fighting began. Israel had to expand its operation.
Civilian casualties on both sides kept rising. International pressure intensified. The Israeli Government, which set out to smash Hezbollah and thus resisted an international force, now said it would welcome one. It just wanted to finish its job. For that, the Americans continued to buy it time.
Will Israel now be able to finish that job? It is looking doubtful. Fighting remains intense. Israeli commanders are already acknowledging that they can't now eliminate Hezbollah's military apparatus. At best, they can degrade it. As for the organisation's political infrastructure, this is now looking sufficiently robust that an eventual regrouping of the military wing remains a strong possibility anyhow.
Ever more isolated
Meanwhile, Israel finds itself ever more isolated. The Bush administration stands by it, to be sure. However, the governments' shared diplomatic goals are in a shambles. They had hoped to isolate Iran - a staunch backer of Hezbollah - in the region. Instead, Hezbollah's effective fighting has arguably given Iran more prestige, while strengthening the hand of the hardliners in Tehran. One friend of mine in Beirut remarked to me that in the end, Israel will just produce a generation of little bin Ladens.
As for the U.S., Condoleeza Rice's carefully cultivated efforts to restore American diplomatic clout in the region have been blown back to square one. The Americans are not seen as honest brokers. The Bush administration has thrown its lot in with Israel. If Israel's gamble does not pay off soon, the White House will not even have the luxury of being able to say 'I told you so'.
War is hell, the Israelis will maintain. But if out of it they can claim a victory, at least they will be able to say their gamble paid off. But it is now looking like all they may have delivered is hell.
John Rapley is a senior lecturer in the Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Mona.
