The PNP's election victory

Stephen Vasciannie

FIRST, WHY did the PNP win? After all, it is not too difficult to make the case that they should have lost.

The PNP had shattered the two-term syndrome in 1997, but, in a sense, they had argued that 1997 really marked the start of P.J. Patterson's second term as Prime Minister. This time around, the PNP was going for an unprecedented fourth term, and they were doing so with a questionable track record in several areas of government. And yet, they prevailed.

The PNP prevailed for a variety of reasons. On the positive side, the party's organisational structure held together. Paul Robertson and Maxine Henry-Wilson apparently took nothing for granted, and certainly put their time off from Ministerial duties to good use. Owing to superior organisational infrastructure, various PNP lieutenants were always accessible to the media, and on Election Day, there are reports, for instance, that in Henry-Wilson's constituency, PNP workers were going house to house for supporters well into the afternoon.

Organisational efficiency also reflected itself in public relations and damage limitation. The JLP's Christopher "Put your X beside the Head" Tufton made a mistake one night, and two nights later the television stations were saturated with his gaffe. At the same time, the PNP carefully managed those who could be perceived as political baggage. Karl Blythe did not feature much in the national campaign, but he was certainly busy in Westmoreland. Similarly, Ronnie Thwaites was not prominently positioned in the campaign, though he was pressed into service for the Jamaicans for Justice Forum. So, the party used its resources along the terms specified in the manual.

QUESTIONABLE TACTICS

But it must also be said that the PNP was not above character assassination and questionable tactics in its pursuit of political power. As is now customary in our Manichean political culture, the PNP portrayed the Leader of the Opposition as a man with three horns, bankrupt, incompetent and alien. This message was played to overkill, and it cannot be that either Paul Robertson or Maxine Henry-Wilson (not to mention the Prime Minister) really believed it to be true -- but they engineered it nonetheless. This, the cynic would say, was their way.

And the pragmatist would chime in that the method worked, for in the end, the General Election was, once again, essentially a presidential contest with Patterson versus Seaga on centre stage. To this extent, therefore, the victory of the PNP represents the triumph of P.J. Patterson. In a popularity contest against Edward Seaga, Patterson has prevailed, as before. It may be noted, in passing, that on this occasion Patterson also had questionable help from the NHDC, a government entity which used taxpayers' money to run openly pro-Patterson advertisements throughout the campaign. That cannot be right.

In assessing why the PNP won, some attention must, of course, be placed on the question of the PNP's stewardship in government. My own view is that the last five years have seen little in the way of achievement, solid or otherwise. True, Roger Clarke has espoused the "achievement" of the cellular phone with an enthusiasm that is matched only by his disgruntlement over rotten, foreign meat; it is also true that public transportation has improved, and there are more motor vehicles available for purchase. In the government's favour, one may point, too, to improvements in infrastructure with respect to some roads, hospitals and schools.

At best, however, the achievements that are in place are governmental efforts that we should be able to take for granted in a properly organised democracy; for, if the government cannot borrow money, or use tax revenues, to build roads, buy buses and construct schools and hospitals, tell me, what can it do? And, on the other hand, the deficiencies of the last five years -- or the last 13 if you prefer - remain immediately before us. For instance, in the period between 1997 and 2001, over 4,050 persons have been murdered: if we were not so battered already, we would be horrified at the crisis in our midst.

But, you may interject, the issue of the murder rate is ultimately one of personal responsibility, and it is therefore unfair to attribute this problem to governmental neglect. This perspective is disingenuous. The government must accept some responsibility for allowing, tolerating, and even encouraging some of the social, political and economic conditions that breed murder. And, in any event, there are strong grounds for believing that our murder crisis is linked in part to drug trafficking and turf battles. These problems cannot be tackled effectively by individual citizens; they fall to the government, and they highlight the failure of government within the State.

JLP'S HERCULEAN TASK

Notwithstanding all of the above, the PNP won again. This brings us to the role of the JLP in securing the fourth term for the PNP. The JLP had a Herculean task on its hands because, starting the race with a 48 to 12 handicap, it needed to win 19 additional seats to capture power; and it needed to do so in the full knowledge that the garrisons of Kingston and St. Andrew would continue to vote for the PNP (with the exception of West Kingston). In the end, there was a marked swing for the JLP, which yielded 13 seats to Belmont Road, just not enough on the day to overturn the PNP's dominance.

But why not enough on the day? On this point, Mr Seaga must assume his own share of responsibility. One has the distinct sense that the Leader of the Opposition needed more help from his lieutenants, and that the last-minute return of Bruce Golding, though invigorating to committed JLP voters, conformed to the dead cat thesis.

Ultimately, Mr Seaga is responsible for this state of affairs: when he emasculated Pearnel Charles ("light yuh candle, sing yuh sankey and find your way back home"), and when he dismissed Mr Charles' brother-in-law and others as deadwood, and when he indicated that none of his lieutenants were equipped to take over, he was hammering nails into the potential of the JLP as an electoral force. Very few self-respecting politicians can completely ignore such public condemnation of their colleagues, and though in recent years this has dawned on Mr Seaga, it is clear that his combative tone from the early to mid-1990s has served to undermine the effectiveness of the JLP as a unit.

In some senses, this is a cause for regret. Now, we will probably never know whether the second coming of Seaga would have helped to invigorate the government, and, in particular, to inculcate greater efficiency in the affairs of State. Instead, with a government going into its fourth term of office, we face the risk of leadership that is lethargic and distant from the people. The Prime Minister appears to realise this, and sounded the warning against corruption in his victory speech on Wednesday night. We will see whether Prime Ministerial intentions match day-to-day realities in the months to come.

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