Winston Sill/ Freelance Photographer
Edward Seaga greets enthusiastic supporters on the campaign trail. Whither his future in the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) now?Lloyd Williams, Senior Associate Editor
In the wake of the October 16, 2002 general election, Edward Phillip George Seaga is likely to vacate the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) leader's chair which he has been occupying since 1974.
If he does so, he would have accepted the Carl Stone view that Jamaicans vote "presidential" style, a la the system in the United States which accepts that it's the leader who wins or loses, the electorate voting for or against the leader rather than for or against the rest of the slate.
But he is not likely to step down until a year's time.
Mr. Seaga must now certainly be assessing his role as leader in light of the fact that under his stewardship, the JLP lost the 1989, 1993 and 1997 general elections and the local government elections of 1986, 1990 and in 1998.
The JLP's latest election loss is being blamed on Mr. Seaga's 28-year command at the helm, which some JLP supporters say is militating against the JLP's electability as the Government of the country.
To the question, "Why did the JLP lose?", a high-level party insider shot back: "The low turnout of voters".
Then he went on: "But then the question is what is the reason for the low turnout of voters? And I think it falls squarely on leadership. While people were fed up with the PNP and wanted a change, they don't see an Edward Seaga-led JLP as the answer. That, I think, is the principal reason why we lost."
Q: What about the level of the JLP's organisation going into the polls?
A: The JLP was this time better organised than ever before, so it's not organisation why it lost - it's leadership. The PNP's organisation had been good and it is good, but it wasn't superior to the JLP's. It had been said in recent elections that the PNP was better organized on the ground than the JLP but that can be disputed now because in the St. Ann North East by-election the JLP demonstrated its superior organisation and won the seat".
Q: So how did the PNP win?
A: They won by focusing on the anti-Seaga sentiments. They had no message, no issues that were new. In fact, they didn't dwell on issues. The entire campaign was devoid of real issues. It was a Seaga-focused campaign. It was focused virtually entirely on Seaga. It didn't deal with their so-called 'Solid Achievements' and their plans for the future. That wasn't the source of their campaign. Their campaign was anti-Seaga. So they played upon the sentiments of the people.
"During the course of the campaign when all their advertisements were negative and focused on Seaga, ordinarily you would think that the advertisements and commercials would turn off people, but what they were doing was playing on the (anti-Seaga) sentiments that's out there and in hindsight it was a thought-out campaign. In hindsight, they probably were strategically right because what they were doing was to focus on the reluctance of the populace at large to vote for Seaga even though the people wanted to change the Government."
"The leadership question", according to the JLP insider, "has to be dealt with in short order. That has to be on the agenda early".
JLP conference
The next occasion that will provide the opportunity for Mr. Seaga's leadership to be put on the agenda is the JLP's annual conference which is scheduled for November. The dates and venue have yet to be announced.
Insight into the scenario which is likely to arise at the conference, has come from a still staunch Seagaite whose loyalty to the party and to the leader was unshaken during "The Gang of Five" revolt and "The Western 11" dissension which led to the resignation of Bruce Golding on February 27, 1995 as chairman of the JLP and the eventual formation by him on October 29 that year of the National Democratic Movement (NDM).
Mr. Golding rejoined the JLP on October 26 this year. He had earlier cited his view that third parties in Jamaica were dead in the water.
But Mr. Seaga will most likely be allowed to leave in his own good time which will also facilitate Mr. Golding, his newly-returned heir-apparent to taking over the reins of the party smoothly.
Mr. Seaga's departure must take into account the following:
The JLP's constitution stipulates that to be eligible to run for the post of leader, a member must have been a member of the party's Central Executive for one year.
This means that Mr. Golding would have to wait for a year before he is eligible. If Mr. Seaga were to demit office at the conference in November, Mr. Golding would be ruled out of the leadership race for now.
The likely resolution to the succession problem is that Mr. Seaga will be nominated for leader. If he is not challenged, then he will be re-elected unopposed. He is then likely to announce that that is the last time he will be seeking nomination, thus opening the race for leader at the next conference in November 2003.
If he is to be challenged for the leadership, it would more likely be by Mike Henry than by Pearnel Charles or Audley Shaw.
The other factor is that if he does not accept the post in the House of Representatives of Leader of the Opposition, then he would have to appoint another sitting Member of Parliament (MP) to it. But what seems likely is that he will hold both posts for the year until the next JLP conference in November 2003.
So now the votes for the October 16 general election have been counted. Some desks are being cleared; some people are ordering new wardrobes for their grand entry to Gordon House soon, as members of the new administration - Government and Opposition.
Others, not less deserving perhaps, but because the world turns, will be on the outside looking in, much to their disappointment.
Why did the PNP win?
Some observers believe that it was not so much that the PNP won the election, but that the JLP lost it. So why did the JLP lose an election which to so many people, it seemed to have had on a platter?
And the question in no way detracts from the organisational skills of the architects of the PNP's victory, the hard work done by its people on the ground, and the creativity of its election campaign.
So how did the PNP win?
A PNP insider sought to explain it from his perspective:
"We started quite early to track public opinion scientifically, so while the polls were going on and everybody was discussing them, we were tracking public opinion, not just by polls. We had our focus group operations where you knew the sentiments, you knew the issues, you knew what people wanted you to do. You knew the grouses they had with you. That was an important part and that started quite early.
"We were able to pick up the dissatisfaction where it existed, we were able to work through some of that in a fairly scientific way using a sample, how people wanted you to respond and that helped to tailor your message going into a campaign.
"But critically, the on-the-ground mobilisation, the full-time work of the campaign director and the campaign manager, any one thing would have been what made the difference. How you got the workers to do the training, to do your canvass, those things are critical, especially when there is sentiment going against you for whatever reason; it is critical to have your on-the-ground machinery."
According to him, the PNP approached the campaign from two perspectives - "the air war" - electronic media advertising - and the ground war - the actual organisation from the grassroots up. The PNP relied on radio, as the medium having the widest reach, to get to the people whose votes it wanted.
Also, the PNP spent a lot of time on message development. "I don't think we got everything right; there is so much more that we could have done."
But what was critical for the PNP was taking people's views into account and speaking to them.
"I don't think we were able to promote the manifesto enough and allow people to know what was in it, in the timeframe, but that helped to guide what went into the manifesto and so when people were saying we had no manifesto, we weren't worried about that. What we were doing was getting the feedback from the different focus groups all across Jamaica in terms of what people thought about agriculture, what people thought we should do about information technology, what people wanted us to do about education, why they felt unsafe and things like those. So it can begin to form part of the policy thinking going into a manifesto as to what to do in the next term. You have to respond to people. That's the business you are in."
What was important to the PNP was the mobilisation on the ground, plus the approach to the message development and getting the message to the people.
To this PNP insider, in the period leading up to the election, the JLP definitely had public sentiment going for it in terms of the high level of disaffection and disenchantment and disapproval of the Government that they could have capitalised on.
The JLP's defeat really meant that the party did not capitalise on it to the degree that would put it into office.
"It has to do with how you factor that into your total campaign. In other words, that cannot be your total campaign. You must have some substance that you are coming with to make yourself likeable, to make people want to log on to you.
"Yes, the people know what the problem is with us, but what exactly are you bringing to the table? I think the JLP failed not just in articulating what the popular disaffection was but by failing to package themselves adequately to be an effective counter to the PNP."
To his mind, the Bruce Golding re-entry was seen as a last-minute desperate approach which could have turned off a lot of people.
"They should have gone all out to get back Bruce earlier and that would have given them more credibility and given them time to pick up whatever momentum they would have gained from that. So I think they made some strategic mistakes."
Leadership comparisons
Mr. Seaga, of course, is nowhere on the PNP's list of its favourite people, but it swears it did nothing during the campaign to demonise him.
Comrades argue that he is a liability to the JLP and the party had not been able to sell him so the Jamaican people love him. They argue also that even the significant gains the JLP had made were despite Seaga, and not because of him.
"On the other hand, we had a leader who, although his popularity might have been low at one point, once we put some things in place, his popularity rose again. With him, we have material we could work with. He is likeable as a person, maybe not as a leader, but once you start to put him out there as a person, the people can identify with him and even like him. So in terms of the leadership, there was no comparison. We had a good thing that we could work with in terms of our leader and how we package him and how we put him out there. You didn't need to do any whole heap of packaging either, you just put him out there and let the people see him, the true P.J. Patterson.... We tried to keep him in touch with the people and in politics, if you are close to the people you can't go wrong."
The PNP-led Government began packaging its "Solid Achievement" message from late 2000 to early 2001, but it wasn't reaching the people in a direct way.
"We had some project launches and relied heavily on the media to carry them. The PNP had never been the party to knock media, but we picked up some sentiments in the media that said it is time for the PNP to get out of power and time for somebody else to come in. And that, in some way, translated itself in how some things were carried and not carried, and were played out. In that scenario you cannot as an incumbent Government, the party in power for 13 years, rely solely on the normal news channels to carry your message. You have to create avenues."
So the PNP started a programme on radio that reached everybody - it got the widest reach and people were beginning to hear every week what the Government was doing and it was tailored in a way that was simple and direct. "So people started to see the "Solid Achievements" in more tangible forms. "And we used some expert help and that makes the difference every time."
Also the PNP put out a "Solid Achievement" video that was run on television a few times. But what was critical was getting it to every community. So the PNP put it on cable - into people's houses - highlighting what the Government was doing and identifying the party with it. And to counter the criticism that that was what the Government was supposed to do, the focus of the message was that "this is what the party in Government was doing for you". So it was important promoting the "Solid Achievements" in that direct way where it was more visible and where people could readily identify with it.
What the PNP insider neglected to mention was the concomitant use of JIS radio and television to promote Government programmes.
My take on the elections
So, in my opinion, why did the JLP lose the 2002 General Election?
When the JLP's public relations machinery is not bad, it is awful. At any time of the year the PNP's public relations runs rings around that of the JLP.
Back in election year 1993, the JLP put out a tiny booklet with the names and telephone numbers of its election candidates and party officials. This writer came across dozens of them at an office he was visiting. He asked for one as a journalist, and was promised it, but to this day it hasn't arrived. The PNP at the same time had published a similar booklet. It sent one to this writer, unrequested, and it has been working for the party since. This is anecdotal but it's true.
To my mind General Election 2002 was more of a candidates' election than a party election, although both parties put their full weight behind their candidates' campaigns.
Electors seemed to have been more fastidious and selective in their choice of candidates rather than voting blindly for party. And they seemed to have gone for the candidates who were the better organised.
But the JLP got carried away by the result of the March 8, 2001 by-election that Shahine Robinson won for the party in St. Ann North Eastern.
It was a victory which Mrs. Robinson repeated convincingly in the October 16, 2002 General Election and it was solid and well-organised.
But it was in a way to lead to the JLP falling so short of election victory on Wednesday.
For a start, the JLP, after the St. Ann North Eastern by-election victory, began to rely too heavily, it seemed, on public opinion pollsters, the same pollsters, if you ask me, who influenced the formation of the NDM by convincing its founders that the time was ripe, the atmosphere was right for the successful incubation of a third party conceived as new and different.
But to paraphrase Bruce Golding at The Gleaner's Editors' Forum a few weeks ago, politics in Jamaica tends to be seen as an investment - with people putting in only if they believe they will be able to take out accordingly. Hence the failure of the NDM and other third parties to really take root.
In the 2002 general election, the fact that the JLP had led in the polls consistently for so long, perhaps, lulled it into a sense of false security which left it depending too much on a national swing in the polls to sweep it to victory, when in fact the situation was changing, especially at the 11th hour. And so because it believed it had a national swing going in its favour, it did not do as much as it should have done to bring home what would have been its first contested general election victory in 22 years.
Perhaps the JLP would have done well to heed E.B. White's advice: "The so-called science of poll-taking is not a science at all but a mere necromancy. People are unpredictable by nature, and although you can take a nation's pulse, you can't be sure that the nation just hasn't run up a flight of stairs."
In June 2001, the JLP announced a national canvass involving more than 12,000 party workers in 4,000 polling divisions covering 35 constituencies.
The project, called "Operation Groundswell", was designed to bring each of the 60 constituencies into a state of readiness for the general election whenever it was called.
Could it be that by October 16, 2002, "Operation Groundswell" had run out of steam? Or could it be as "The Western 11" had been saying from 1995 and "The Gang of Five" before it, that a JLP led by Edward Seaga is difficult to elect?
