The struggle over Iran's future LAST WEEKEND, Iran's reformist President, Mohammed Khatami, won re-election in a landslide victory. Not only did he increase his vote share over the 1997 result, but a much-feared collapse in participation failed to materialise. The conservatives who oppose President Khatami's campaign to reform the Islamic Republic thus have little ground upon which to base their resistance. Nevertheless, that does not mean they will give up their opposition to change. The decaying Iranian monarchy was overthrown in a 1979 revolution noteworthy for its motley composition. Initially, the shape post-revolutionary Iran would take was uncertain. However, after a short period of flux, the Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei returned from exile and created the Islamic Republic that still exists today. Iranian law was rewritten to conform with Islamic law, and conservative clerics took precedence over a newly-formed democracy. Ayatollah Khomenei himself became the Supreme Leader, with final control over legislative matters, the military, the judiciary, the broadcast media and revolutionary paramilitary organisations. Upon his death in 1989, Ayatollah Khomenei was succeeded as Supreme Leader by Ayatollah Ali Khameneii. After the revolution, Khomenei's supporters quickly occupied positions in the state and monopolist public enterprises. Initially, they sought to create both a social and economic revolution that would sweep through the Middle East. But by the end of the 1980s, weakened by a devastating war with Iraq (in which the US, incidentally, backed Iraq), the Islamic Revolution had lost its dynamism. The initial revolutionary fervour that emerged across the Middle East had died down somewhat, and the Iranian economy was beset with problems. In the meantime, Iran's high birth rate produced a rapidly growing population of young people with no memory of the monarchy. With less cause for attachment to the Islamic Republic, they were hungry for change. In particular, they wanted more freedom. In 1997, they united with women voters to bring the reformist candidate, Mohammed Khatami, to power. Khatami did not intend to overthrow the Islamic Republic, merely to make it kinder and gentler. He is apparently inclined to see himself as part of a global axis of emerging politicians who seek to restore religious principles to politics without, however, descending into extremes of fundamentalism. In that vein, he reportedly has a soft spot for the Pope and the orientation he believes they share. Nevertheless, by then the revolutionaries were solidly entrenched. As revolutionaries are prone to do once they have taken power, they had become quite conservative. Some now seek to defend their economic interests or positions of power. Others fear that reformist attempts to limit clerical power are the thin edge of a wedge that will ultimately bang open the door to the end of the Islamic Republic. So, despite, Khatami's clear mandate for change, reaffirmed in last year's parliamentary elections, conservatives have fought back. Using their control of the judiciary and paramilitary organisations, they have intimidated opponents, clamped down on the emerging free press, and harassed the students who provide much of Khatami's support. Some hope that President Khatami's decisive victory will coy them into submission. The reason for such optimism is that in recent months, there has been evidence of growing divisions within conservative ranks. Equally, some speculate that Ayatollah Khameneii, who has backed conservative efforts to thwart reform, may actually favour much of Khatami's agenda. However, such analysts believe he has to clamp down on reformists, without actually crushing them, in order to forestall a coup by right-wing hardliners. But if hardliners now see that a coup will incur the people's wrath, they may back down, allowing Khameneii more freedom. Yet such optimism must be tempered with caution. For starters, President Khatami's support may not be as solid as it appears. Many Iranians are disappointed he did not stand up to the conservatives in his first term of office. Moreover, given the reformists' own low level of popular mobilisation, the movement could easily evaporate. Finally, there is the matter of the economy. The resources for lasting political and social reform are unlikely to materialise unless President Khatami produces an agenda for deep economic reform. To date, in no small part because of divisions among his own backers, he has failed to produce one. So the struggle over Iran's future is far from over. Much will hinge on what President Khatami himself decides to read into last weekend's mandate. John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
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